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Abstract 
 
This paper takes Hermann von Helmholtz’s (1821 – 1894) psychophysiological theory of 
perception as a point of departure to examine the conditions of possibility for the process of 
objectification which necessarily mediates the interactions of complex living beings with their 
environment. By means of an analysis of the 1855 statement ‘to see is to understand sensation’, I 
will argue that the epistemological framework of Helmholtz’s optics can be analyzed 
transcendentally on two levels of analysis, namely critical and metacritical. Both levels are 
concerned with the way in which objectivity is constituted by an active, sensitive being, but while 
the former is concerned with the imposition of structure by our cognitive organization, the latter 
deals with the constitutional role of the (sensitivity) to constraint. It will be demonstrated how 
this general epistemological strategy could also help structuring the questions involved in 
accounting for the internal models that necessarily underlie the activity of anticipation.  More 
specifically, I will argue that Helmholtz’s work could provide some powerful insights into the 
notion of ‘constraint’, which is considered to be crucial in accounting for the ability for 
anticipation according to Stepp and Turvey (2010), amongst others.  
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1. Introduction 
In the past decades, philosophers of perception seem to have become increasingly aware of the 
shortcomings of approaches to human vision in which perceiving is characterized as a mere 
cognitive activity of processing sensory information
1
. Recently however, sensorimotor theories of 
perception are trying to overcome the strict separation between sensory perception and the 
generation of behavior, underlying this so called ‘information processing paradigm’, by stressing 
the intimate connection between seeing and acting
2
. As Gross et al. (1999) note, this latter 
paradigm seems to imply that behavioral decisions are made on the basis of a sensory 
representation, where the latter is prior to the former. By definition then, this account can only 
make sense of reactive, or ‘data-driven’ behavioral decisions, and will have a hard time 
                                                          
1
 Gross et all. (1999). 
2
 This new perspective is most prominently represented by the ‘enactive approach’, developed mainly in the works of 
Alva Noë (see for example Noë (2004)). 
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explaining proactive (or top-down) adaptive behavior, or in Dennet’s words: ‘the ability to 
coordinate with the future
3’, that characterizes complex living beings.  
As Friston & Stephan (2007) suggest, Hermann von Helmholtz’s (1821 – 1894) perception 
theory is quite interesting in this respect, because it can be considered as an extraordinary 
detailed account of how perceptual learning and inference serve exactly as a means to maximize 
this ability to coordinate with possible future events, or in other words: the ability to anticipate. In 
fact, Helmholtzian perception seems to be essentially anticipatory in nature (as I will illustrate in 
section 2)
4
. Therefore, a historical detour through the epistemological foundations of the Berlin 
scientist’s psychophysiological optics, could certainly provide some general insights into the 
fundamental nature of anticipation.  
More specifically, Helmholtz’s theory of human vision could serve as a point of departure to 
investigate the conditions of possibility of anticipation as a determinate activity, in the Fichtean 
sense
5
: 
‘what does a ‘determinate activity’ mean? And how does an activity become 
determinate or determined? Merely by having some resistance posited in 
opposition to it – posited in opposition: that is to say, a resistance that is thought 
of by means of ideal activity and imagined to be standing over against the latter
6’ 
The determinateness of anticipation lies in the fact that although it is an activity that is directed 
towards the (imaginary) realm the possible (and even the preferable), it necessarily remains tied 
to, or disciplined by, a degree of reality, that is maybe best captured with the theoretical notion of 
‘constraint’. This aligns with Stepp and Turvey’s (2010, p.150) assertion that the ability to 
anticipate is essentially constituted by
7
:  
‘(a) the existence of constraints (on the states of the environment and on the states 
of the organism’s body), and (b) sensitivity, on the organism’s part, to the existing 
constraints. By definition a constraint on a thing or process means that the thing or 
process cannot exhibit all of its potential variety.’  
This suggests that the internal models of the environment that are involved in anticipation, consist 
at least partly of an internalization of external constraints, and thus presuppose a preceding 
process of objectification. As I will show, Helmholtz’s work on perception could offer some 
powerful insights into the constitutional role of (sensitivity to) constraint in this objectification 
process, and especially into the way in which the ‘sensitivity to constraint’ could be 
operationalized on a psychophysiological level. This account, and especially the Fichtean 
background against which it was constructed, could be said to proceed from the basic assumption 
                                                          
3
 In Stepp and Turvey (2010). 
4
 Gross et al. (1999, p. 1101) summarize this action-oriented approach to human vision as follows:: ‘Perception is 
assumed to be a generative process of anticipating the course of events resulting from alternative sequences of 
hypothetically executed actions.’ 
5
 Fichte (2005 [1798]), p. 12. 
6
 Ibid. p. 12. 
7
 See also Kljajíc (2001, p. 404) for example, who states that the process of anticipation is constantly (and 
necessarily) mediated by the (experience of) the resistance of the environment to a person’s intentions.  
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of a foundational, or non-objectal subjectivity
8
 as a formal condition for the internalization of 
external reality.  
It is important to notice however, that Helmholtz’s elaboration of this general idea is not 
restricted to the activity of anticipation, but was meant to provide an answer to what he 
considered to be one of the most basic epistemological problems confronting the theory of human 
vision, namely that of distinguishing between (the qualitatively identical) states of excitation 
arising from external objects, and those arising from pure mental states such as ‘memories, 
intentions, wishes, moods.
9’ Consequently, it will be treated within this general framework in 
what follows. 
Recognizing reality as constraint is one thing, making sense of it is another. So on the other hand, 
a transcendental account of anticipation should address the question of how the materiality – 
obtained through the sensitivity for constraint – is structured a priori by our cognitive 
organization, thus enabling the formation of meaningful (or adequate) internal models. Whereas 
the above mentioned problem of ‘constraint’ could be said to pertain to the fundamental origin of 
the (possible) content of such models, this question has to do with their necessary form. At a 
more general epistemological level, this concern has to do with the formal conditions for 
something to be comprehensible. Here again, the epistemological basis of Helmholtz’s theory of 
perception is interesting, in its insistence on the fact that this kind of comprehensibility is tied to 
the a priori functioning of the causal law. 
I will discuss the way in which Helmholtz deals with both of these issues in detail, by taking his 
1855 statement ‘to see is to understand sensation’ as a point of departure10. Two possible ways of 
accounting for the conditions of possibility for ‘understanding’ implied will be suggested, in 
accordance with the double structure of the philosophical concerns mentioned above, namely as a 
matter of (1) cognitive structuring, and (2) the recognition of constraint. 
Moreover, this double structure could be said to reflect the historical progression from Kant’s 
critical project to Fichte’s radicalization and extension of transcendental idealism through a 
theoretical shift which is described by Steigerwald (2003, p. 112) as a change in focus from
11
:  
‘the interrogation of how cognition in general is possible to an interrogation of 
how a critique of cognition is possible […]’,  For Fichte this metacritique required 
attending to the activity of the I [Ich] in thinking, to thinking or acting with the I 
in all its cognitive processes.’ 
In other words: on the one hand there is the critical (Kantian inspired) question of 
comprehensibility, and on the other hand the metacritical (Fichtean inspired) question of the 
                                                          
8
 See section 2.2. The term ‘non-objectal [ungegenständlich] subjectivity’ was introduced by Schleiermacher to refer 
to a core subjectivity, and the essence of personhood, and could be considered as an analogue to Schelling’s ‘original 
[urständlich] subjectivity’, and to Fichte’s elaboration of the immediate acquaintance of (self-)consciousness with 
itself (Frank (2007, p. 152)). Frank (2007) uses the term as a more general characterization of the (originally 
idealistic idea) of a kind of irreducible subjectivity, which means amongst others that it is not produced by a 
reflective activity or a sensory intuition, but on the contrary, is ‘already familiar with itself before reflection’ (p. 
152).  
9
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]), p. 349. 
10
 Helmholtz (1896 [1855]), p.100. 
11
 See also Zöller (2009). 
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constitutional role of constraint. In what follows, I will address the way in which Helmholtz deals 
with these questions in that order, in order to preserve this historical logics.  In conclusion, I will 
show how the general insights gained from this historical inquiry could inspire a transcendental 
approach to anticipation from a critical and a metacritical perspective.  
2. Understanding understanding: a transcendental perspective 
As a way of clarifying the basic outline of his theory of human vision, Helmholtz
12
 frequently 
appeals to the metaphor of language. More specifically, he insists that the processes involved in 
perceptual learning and perceptual understanding show great similarity with those underlying 
language acquisition and comprehension
13
. Sensations, according to Helmholtz, are natural signs 
or symbols, similar to the individual words of a language, and as such, (1) they do not resemble 
that which they signify and (2) their interpretation has to be learned through practice and 
experience
14
. Helmholtz therefore describes sensations  – in themselves nothing more than 
subjective states of excitation or functional activity
15
 –  as ‘a language given us with our 
organization by which external objects discourse to us
16’.  
It is important to notice that this last sentence implies that not every sensation counts as a sign, 
but only those belonging to the ‘discourse of external objects’. This is what motivated Helmholtz 
to introduce the distinction between objective and subjective sensations
17
, in his Treatise of 
Physiological Optics. Whereas both indicate a sensory change, the former are caused by objective 
activity (and have an external origin), while the latter denote the effect of subjective activity (and 
are thus internally generated). Furthermore, Helmholtz insists that sensations as such carry no 
intrinsic marker regarding their origin. For the sake of clarity, I will refer to this core assumption 
of Helmholtz’s theorizing as the original underdetermination of sensation in what follows.  
2.1.  The causal architecture of representation: Helmholtz’s Kant 
For Helmholtz, the process of understanding a sign (in the sense of understanding its meaning) 
comes down to finding the law that regulates it 
18
. The underlying assumption here is that 
                                                          
12
 See for example Helmholtz (1995 [1869; 1878; 1892]). 
13
 In ‘The Theory of Vision’ Helmholtz (1995 [1868], p. 201) states for example: ‘There is a most striking analogy 
between the entire range of processes which we have been discussing, and another System of Signs, […] I mean the 
words of our mother tongue. […] First, the child has to guess that the sounds it hears are intended to be signs at all; 
next the meaning of each separate sound must be found out, by the same kind of induction as the meaning of the 
sensations of sight or touch […].’ 
14
 The main point here is that just as the word ‘table’ for example, does not resemble the physical object it signifies, a 
state of functional activity (sensation) does not resemble its cause (Helmholtz (1910 [1867]), p. 20. Obviously, an 
important difference between sensations as signs and the symbolic structure of language, lies in the fact that the 
former are not human creations, but determined by our physiology. The language metaphor used by Helmholtz is 
however useful in understanding that sensations denote physical objects, just as the individual words of a language 
denote their meaning. For a comprehensive account of the difference and relation between representation – 
resemblance – symbolization and denotation, see for example Goodman (1976). 
15
 Helmholtz (1995 [1868]) p. 149. 
16
 Helmholtz (1995 [1869]), p. 222. 
17
 Helmholtz (1910 [1867]), p. 17. 
18
 Helmholtz (1995 [1869]), p. 208-209.  From what follows it should be clear that the faculty of understanding in 
Helmholtz shows a striking similarity with that of Kant, namely as the ‘faculty of cognition of rules (and thus 
cognition through concepts) […]’ (Kant (2006 [1796], p. 91). The central concept for Helmholtz is that of causality, 
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objective sensations (signs) relate to their cause in a systematic manner, that is: every object is 
associated with a particular system of signs, or has an idiosyncratic way of presenting itself to the 
senses
19
. What is meant by ‘the law’ in this context can be better understood through the 
language-metaphor: every external object or event has a particular way of discoursing with our 
senses, or in other words: it is associated with a specified system of signs that we learn to 
decipher through experience
20
. This systematicity reveals itself only through time, since it does 
not pertain to  isolated signs (which are essentially arbitrairy), but to their law- like succession, or 
combination. The inferential process, through which a sensation is understood as the law-like 
expression of an external object or event (as a stable and enduring cause
21
), Helmholtz describes 
as a process of unconscious inductive inference.  
What distinguishes Helmholtz from strict empiricist theories of perception such as those 
elaborated by J.S. Mill and David Hume however
22
, is the fact that according to the former, the 
law of causality is not derived from inductive inference. It is rather the other way around: the 
capacity for inductive inference (and determining law-likeness) depends upon causality as an a 
priori, transcendental law
23
. The experience of law-likeness, is thus not a contingent figment of 
imagination as it is in Hume for example, but a necessary condition for experience itself. As 
Hatfield (1993, p. 557) puts it, Helmholtz asserted that the mind ‘[…] is driven to seek the 
lawful,’ and ‘can only comprehend a nature that is lawful.’ I would consider this to be a critical 
aspect of Helmholtz work, because it answers the question of ‘what it is to understand’ by means 
of a critical examination of what is needed in order for something to be comprehensible. And 
what is needed, according to Helmholtz, is the a priori imposition of structure upon any possible 
‘given’, which logically precedes all a posteriori organization of empirical reality.  
One of the epistemological implications of this line of thought is that our knowledge can pertain 
only to effective reality or ‘actuality’ [Wirklichkeit], and not to a kind of mind-independent 
reality
24
. Helmholtzian ‘actuality’ literally denotes reality as it acts upon (or causally interacts 
with)  our senses. The ability to represent this reality can thus be nothing more than: ‘to be able 
to think how something happens […] or the power of imagining the whole series of sensible 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
which is not derived from experience, but instead has to be presupposed as a condition of possibility for the 
comprehensibility of appearances.  
19
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]). 
20
 Helmholtz (1995 [1869]), p. 222. 
21
 The existence of causes as the invariable source of changing phenomena, remains a hypothesis, and the only thing 
that we can know factually, is the law-like (Helmholtz (1995 [1878], p. 360). 
22
 It should be noted however, that Helmholtz was without doubt influenced by Mill’s account of inductive inference 
in his formalization of the inductive processes underlying vision (see for example Helmholtz (1910 [1867]). 
23
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]), p. 363: ‘The law of causality […] expresses a trust in the complete comprehensibility of 
the world. Comprehension […]  is the method whereby our thought masters the world, orders the facts and 
determines the future in advance. […] The law of causality […] is an a priori given, transcendental law. A proof of 
it from experience is not possible, since the first steps of experience […] are not possible without employing 
inductive inference, i.e. without the law of causality.’ It should be noted however, that Helmholtz’s formalization of 
perceptual judgment as an inductive inference, was definitely influenced by Mill, as Helmholtz himself explicitly 
recognizes (see for example Helmholtz (1910 [1867]), and Erdmann (1921)). But as Schiemann (2009) points out, 
besides the similarities, there are also significant differences, especially pertaining to the epistemological status of 
the principle of causality as an a priori principle in Helmholtz, and an empirical concept in Mill. 
24
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]). 
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impressions that would be had in such a case
25’. That is: imagining possible effects of 
hypothesized causes.  
It is interesting to notice how an (objective) idea for Helmholtz has a distinctive generative 
character, and could be interpreted as a predictive model, which coordinates the interaction with 
the environment. Based on this representation, a perceiver is able to predict possible future 
sensations tied to the presence of the hypothesized object or event. This generative side of 
perception could therefore best be described as explicitly anticipatory in nature, allowing for pro-
active engagement with the environment, rather than mere reactivity to what is actually present 
in sensory experience. From this perspective, it is quite understandable that Helmholtz is often 
credited for laying out the foundations of the now popular paradigm of perception as Bayesian 
inference
26
. However, it would be wrong to characterize the Helmholtzian perceiver as a mere 
‘observer-with-calculator’, as I will show in the next section27.  
The emphasis Helmholtz puts on the fact that what something is, is only represented in terms of 
how it (inter)acts, can hardly be overestimated. Theoretically, this amounts to a definition of 
objectivity not in terms of truth (or exact correspondence) per se, but in terms of the practical 
adequacy of a representation for an agent28: ‘Our ideas cannot be anything but symbols […] for 
things we learn how to use in order to regulate our movements and actions.’  
To summarize: at this first (critical) level of analysis, Helmholtz establishes causality as a 
transcendental condition for the comprehensibility of the ‘discourse’ of external reality. The 
interpretation of an objective sensation is thus conditioned a priori by the rule that ‘similar 
objects produce similar signs
29’. In Kantian terms: the materiality of experience (sensation) is 
necessarily conditioned by the form of understanding, and in Helmholtz this comes down to the a 
priori imposition of law-likeness (as causality) to all sensations.   
At this point, Helmholtz encounters a fundamental problem, namely the fact that in perceptual 
processes, some of the experienced sensory changes are not the effect of an external activity, but 
originate in the perceiving subject himself: the sensory effects of self-generated movements
30
. 
Given the fact that Helmholtz maintains what I have called the original underdetermination of 
sensation, this poses a genuine problem for his theory of perception: if there is no intrinsic 
difference between self-generated affection and external affection, this means that the presence of 
sensation as such is not enough to account for the materiality of experience. This materiality can 
only be derived from a sign, that is: a state of affection that is judged to originate from an 
external source.  
                                                          
25
 Helmholtz (1995 [1870]), p. 229.  
26
 See for example Kersten (2004). 
27
 The idea of ‘observer-with-calculator’ is invoked by Stepp and Turvey  (2010) to refer to those accounts of 
anticipatory systems in which the agent is considered to be represented in isolation of the anticipated system.  
28
 Helmholtz (1910 [1867]), p. 19.  
29
 Helmholtz (1995 [1868)], p. 166. Helmholtz actually establishes rules of this form to be the only possible 
correspondence relation between representations and the external world. 
30
 Here again, the language metaphor can help to gain a better understanding of what this means: as a child we learn 
how to speak by manipulating our vocal apparatus in such a way, that we can produce the intended sounds, and these 
in turn are immediately perceived as being the products of agency. The same is the case with respect to the 
perceptual process: if we move our eyes, we seem to know intuitively that some sensory changes are the effect of our 
own activity, and not of a change in the external world.  
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These considerations prompt Helmholtz to give a (philosophical and physiological) account of  
foundational, non-objectal subjectivity which I like to consider metacritical, because it underlies 
the very possibility of analyzing (perceptual) knowledge in terms of matter and form (signs and 
laws). This dimension of Helmholtz is concerned with the conditions of possibility of 
apprehending a sign qua sign, which, according to the Berlin scientist, is only possible ‘[…] after 
we know how to complete the separation of that which the Ego can and cannot change.
31’ 
According to Helmholtz, this ability is fundamentally dependent upon what he calls ‘können’, or 
knowledge of our own causal efficacy, that is: ‘being acquainted with the particular innervation 
of muscles, which is necessary in order to produce any effect we intend by moving our limbs
32’.  
2.2.  Perception and constraint: Helmholtz’s Fichte 
 
The underdetermination of sensation in Helmholtz prevented him from assuming an original 
differential awareness of  the activity of the Self on the one hand, and the activity of a Non-Self 
on the other. An investigation of what it is to ‘understand sensation’ should therefore go beyond 
the mere cognitive activity involved in linking a sign to its meaning. Instead, it should address the 
conditions of possibility for a sign to function as a sign for something that is not contained in it, 
that is: for a sign to be apprehended as the effect of external activity, in contrast with subjective 
sensations. The awareness of what is objective originates exactly from this experience of 
opposition, and as such, the epistemological status of the object in Helmholtz’s theory is defined 
in a purely negative way, namely as that which is independent from (and opposed to) our will
33
.  
The awareness of an objective constraint to our own intentionality, however, necessarily involves 
a parallel understanding of this very intentionality, or in other words: of the causal efficacy of the 
subject. Only then can a state of opposition arise that allows a discrimination between subjective 
sensations or activity, and objective ones. According to Helmholtz, this is given through the 
immediate awareness of our impulses of will (marker for autonomous causation or intentionality), 
as a conditions of possibility for inferring the presence of external objects. As Westheimer (2008, 
p. 7) puts it: ‘through knowledge of the actuated movement it can be determined what in the 
changes of the sensory impressions can be ascribed to the movements; what remains, by 
inference, is of the real world’. This process Helmholtz describes in Fichtean terms: ‘Fichte’s 
appropriate expression for this is that a Non-ego forces recognition of itself vis-à-vis the Ego
34’ 
Self-consciousness is thus established as a constitutive dimension of empirical or objective 
consciousness.  
Helmholtz however did not satisfy himself with this abstract analysis, and tried to establish a 
physiological basis for the sense of agency [können], through his concept of ‘muscular feeling’. 
This concept comprises three kinds of sensations, namely sensations of ‘(1) the intensity of the 
effort of will [the feeling of innervation], (2) the tension of the muscles, that is, the force by which 
they try to act, and (3) the result of the effort, which […] makes itself felt in the muscle by a 
contraction which actually takes place […]35’.  
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 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]), p 362. 
32
 Helmholtz (1995 [1868]), p. 198. 
33
 Helmholtz (1995 [1892]), p. 405. 
34
 Helmholtz (1995 [1878]), p. 361.  
35
 Helmholtz (1910 [1867]), p. 243.  These kinds of statements have lead philosophers such as Fullinwider (1991) to 
state that Helmholtz had transformed Kant’s transcendental law of causality into a physiological process. In my 
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The Fichtean spirit of this analysis can hardly be denied
36
. To illustrate this, we could turn to 
Fichte’s Sittenlehre, which was published in 1798, and aimed at an examination of the conditions 
of possibility for agency [Wirksamkeit]. Some have suggested that this Fichtean concern is in fact 
to be considered as ‘an extension of Kant’s Transcendental Deduction from the I think to the I 
will
37’. This matches with Fichte’s complaint in the introduction of the Sittenlehre that up until 
that time, the main focus of philosophy had been theoretical, in the sense that philosophy was 
mainly concerned with asserting ‘the correspondence of our representations with things that exist 
supposedly independently from those representations
38’. But how is this experience possible, if 
the I in the ‘I know’, doesn’t somehow know itself, in order to represent something that is 
independent from it? Determining how the subject of consciousness represents itself, is 
indispensable according to Fichte, because it is constitutive for the experience of a world that 
exists in its own right.  
In this way, Fichte’s inquiries into practical philosophy lead him to the conclusion that the 
concepts of free will and voluntary acts are not just important within the restricted domain of 
ethics, but have a constitutive role in experience itself
39
. As such, Fichtean epistemology 
transcends the traditional differentiation between practical and theoretical philosophy: the 
analysis of the conditions of possibility of ‘Wirksamkeit’ (agency) amount to the formulation of 
principles that are basic to answering the questions of theoretical philosophy. As Fichte puts it: 
‘our freedom itself is a theoretical principle for the determination of our world.40’ Martin 
(forthcoming, p.12) summarizes this line of thought as follows: ‘To experience of resistance one 
must somehow also experience oneself as striving toward or for something – an endeavor that 
one finds thwarted by the resistance of the world.’ The main point Fichte tries to make 
throughout his Sittenlehre is the fact that the awareness of the ‘I’ as ‘The ground of change in the 
world’, which is at the root of agency is unmediated and non-reflective, and could therefore be 
considered as an a priori for experience itself
41
, according to Martin (forthcoming).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                            
view, this interpretation might be based upon a conflation between two levels of analysis in Helmholtz’s writings, 
namely the analysis of ‘I will’(meta-critical) and that of ‘I know’ (critical), which give rise to his postulation of two 
interdependent causal circuits in the constitution of empirical consciousness. Different because they each rule over 
one of the two realms that Helmholtz kept so cautiously apart: objective force, and human will (See for example 
Helmholtz (1995 [1869], p. 208), (1995 [1878]), Krüger (1994)).   
36
 It should be acknowledged however, that determining the extent to which Helmholtz’s theory of perception was 
indebted to Fichtean philosophy remains somewhat problematic, to say the least. Although Helmholtz does recognize 
the value of Fichte’s thought as a suitable philosophical background of his theory of perception (see for example 
Helmholtz (1995 [1878]), he was certainly somewhat ambivalent towards it (as he was towards post-Kantian 
idealism in general). For some interesting accounts of the Helmholtz-Fichte relation see for example Heidelberger 
(1994) and Turner (1977).   
37
 Beck (1996), p. 277. Frank (2007) suggests that Fichte’s attempt to found an irreducible subjectivity is actually a 
response to the Kantian difficulties with accounting for the way in which the ‘I’ grasps itself as a subject, in a non 
objectal manner. An objectal representation of the Self would be one that is the result of a reflection through which 
the subject is actually objectified; the problem with these so called reflection models of self-consciousness, 
according to Frank, is that they (1) are circular (since they presuppose that which they want to explain, and (2) 
cannot differentiate between the consciousness of an object and self-consciousness.   
38
 Fichte (2005 [1798]), p. 8. 
39
 Ibid.; Martin (forthcoming). 
40
 Fichte (2005 [1798]), p. 70.  
41
 Martin (forthcoming). 
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3. Conclusion 
The line of reasoning I presented in this paper aligns with the paradigm shift in the philosophy of 
perception mentioned in the introduction, as it is based on the assumption that an ‘objective 
percept’ does not have a cognitive value in its own right that can be analyzed independently from 
the goals and ends of a living, acting being. Instead, it offers a more general perspective on 
perception as a property of  an adaptive living being exhibiting proactive, as well as mere reactive 
behavior
42
. I offered an analysis of this perspective by means of Helmholtz’s statement ‘to see is 
to understand sensation’, and more in particular of the formal conditions underlying the 
understanding implied. As I have shown, these formal conditions can be analyzed on two 
different levels, critical and metacritical, which deal respectively with (1) the way in which our 
cognitive organization imposes its structure upon the possible matter of experience, and (2) the 
way in which (the sensitivity to) constraint plays a constitutional role in objectivation.  
One of the most important insights that can be gained from this investigation is the fact that prior 
to the question of how an organism relates to the environment through internal models, another 
problem should be addressed, namely the question of how the materiality of experience comes to 
be determined in the first place. In Fichtean terms, this materiality has the epistemological status 
of a Not-I, constraining the activity of the I.  For Helmholtz, this insight amounts to the 
recognition of agency as a constitutive dimension of experience, as the ability to know 
presupposes a knowledge of the ability to act, thus establishing an intimate connection between 
the two in accounting for the constitution of external reality in perception.  
As stated in the introduction, this double layered transcendental investigation into the 
epistemological background of Helmholtz’s psychophysiological optics could definitely help in 
formulating some interesting suggestions for the theoretical approach of anticipation as a 
determinate activity. First of all, it demonstrates in the most general way that every interaction 
between an organism and its environment requires (or becomes determined by) (1) the imposition 
of structure, and (2) the sensitivity to constraint. The difference between these two questions is 
essentially based on their opposing ‘direction-of-fit’43: where the first is concerned with the 
conditions enabling the comprehension of the external world through subjective organization, the 
second pertains to the way in which subjective states of excitation first come to be externalized.  
To be sure: both represent the flipside of what is essentially a unitary act. The gain of 
distinguishing between the two becomes clearer however, if we take into consideration the 
possible ‘prediction-errors’ that can arise in the process of anticipatory engagement with the 
environment
44
. It could be hypothesized that this process can fail at two different, but 
interdependent levels. First of all, prediction-error could originate from a rather superficial level, 
and be due to a misapplication of law-likeness for example, or because of an incomplete 
comprehension of the laws at stake. In this case a re-sampling of the environment, or a correction 
in our cognitive representation of the environment could in principle suffice to reduce the margin 
                                                          
42
 In my view, one of the most interesting implications of this approach, is that it could inspire a new perspective on 
epistemological questions pertaining to the objective nature of our representations. More specifically, this analysis 
suggests that representations qualifying as objective, don’t do so by virtue of their alleged correspondence with a 
thing like reality, but instead through their capacity of enabling adequate interaction with the environment.  
43
 Martin (forthcoming). 
44
 Friston & Stephan (2007). 
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of error. At a more fundamental level however, there could be a dysfunction in the internal 
mechanisms through which we are aware of our own intentionality, resulting in an analogue 
disturbance in the ability to discriminate between subjective activity (or agency) and objective 
activity.  Since the latter seems to be more fundamental than the former, it is not unthinkable that 
this will automatically lead to impairments on the more superficial, cognitive level. On the other 
hand, judgmental errors that have to do with the mere cognitive grasp of the environment, do not 
necessarily imply that there is something wrong with what could be called the discriminative 
ability. If we consider anticipation to be the generative side of perception (as suggested in section 
2.1.), these respective flaws or deficits correspond to the phenomena of illusion on the one hand, 
and hallucination on the other.  
The pertinence of this theoretical analysis has become especially clear in contemporary 
neurophysiological research with regard to deficits in the sense of agency (and anticipatory 
capacity) in pathologies such as schizophrenia. A crucial aspect of Helmholtz’s (and Fichte’s) 
account of agency is that it is founded in, and constitutive for a non-objectal subjectivity, or the 
assumption that the sense of Self that is not primarily derived from sensory intuitions. This idea 
has resurfaced in contemporary neurophysiological research in relation to the ‘efference copy 
model’, as a new approach to action control. This paradigm states that copies of motor commands 
(an efference copy which could be considered to be an indicator of willed or voluntary 
movement
45
) and visual feedback signals are constantly compared in an internal comparator 
mechanism. In the case of incongruence between this internal prediction and the actual feedback, 
a sensory event is ascribed to an external cause
46
. 
In the past decades, it has been established empirically that psychotic symptoms may be due to a 
deficit in this internal mechanism, leading for example to the typical feelings of alien control or 
other ‘passivity experiences’47. However, recent findings suggest that disturbances in this internal 
mechanism might also lead to exaggerated feelings of control
48
. Voss et al. (2010) ascribe this to 
a shift from predictive to retroactive ascription of the self-authorship of actions. In the 
terminology I have proposed within the context of this paper, this could be said to imply a shift 
from (unmediated) non-objectal subjectivity, to (sensory mediated) objectal subjectivity, in which 
the sense of agency is not internally generated, but derived from sensory changes. If we take into 
account the possible shift to objectal subjectivity, malfunctions in the efference copy system 
could just as well cause feelings of excessive control in schizophrenia. In general, these findings 
suggest that the ability for objective representation indeed requires some kind of foundational 
subjectivity, and demonstrates the possible relevance of the metacritical investigation I presented 
in this paper.   
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